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Abstract: Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving so-
called intruder constraints in the Dolev Yao model. Most constraint solving procedures for
cryptographic protocol security rely on two properties of constraint systems called knowledge
monotonicity and variable-origination. In this work we relax these restrictions by giving
an NP decision procedure for solving general intruder constraints (that do not have these
properties). Our result extends a ﬁrst work by L. Mazaré in several directions: we allow
non-atomic keys, and an associative, commutative and idempotent symbol (for modeling
sets). We also discuss several new applications of our result.
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Satisﬁabilité des systèmes de contraintes généraux avec
et sans constructeur d'ensemble
Résumé : De nombreux problèmes de décision relatifs à la sécurité des protocoles cryp-
tographiques peuvent être réduits à la résolution de ce que l'on appelle contraintes d'intrus
dans le modèle de Dolev Yao . La plupart des procédures de résolution de contraintes pour
la sécurité des protocoles se basent sur deux propriétés de ces systèmes appelées monotonie
des connaissances et ordonnancement des variables. Dans ce travail nous relâchons ces re-
strictions en présentant une procédure de décision dans NP pour la résolution de contraintes
d'intrus générales, c'est à dire non soumises aux deux propriétés précédentes. Notre résultat
prolonge un premier travail de L. Mazaré dans plusieurs directions: nous autorisons les clés
non-atomique, ainsi qu'un symbole associatif, commutatif et idempotent (pour modéliser les
ensembles). Nous considérons également de nouvelles applications de ce résultat.
Mots-clés : Sécurité, résolution de contraintes, intrus de Dolev-Yao, théorie équationelle,
ACI
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1 Introduction
Detecting ﬂaws in security protocol speciﬁcations under the perfect cryptography assumption
in Dolev-Yao intruder model is an approach that has been extensively investigated in recent
years [18, 2, 22, 12]. In particular symbolic constraint solving has proved to be a very
successful approach in the area. It amounts to express the possibility of mounting an attack,
e.g. the derivation of a secret, as a list of steps where for each step some message has to
be derived from the current intruder knowledge. These steps correspond in general to the
progression of the protocol execution, up to the last one which is the secret derivation.
Enriching standard Dolev-Yao intruder model with diﬀerent equational theories [1, 9] like
exclusive OR, modular exponentiation, Abelian groups, etc. [11, 7, 14] helps to ﬁnd ﬂaws
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that could not be detected considering free symbols only. A particularly useful theory is the
theory of an ACI operator (that is an associative commutative and idempotent operator)
since it allows one to express sets in cryptographic protocols. To our knowledge this intruder
theory has not been considered before.
Up to one exception [16, 17], all proposed algorithms rely on two strong assumptions
about the constraints to be processed: knowledge monotonicity and variable origination.
Constraints satisfying this hypothesis are called well-formed constraints in the literature and
they are not restrictive as these conditions hold when handling standard security problems
with a single Dolev-Yao intruder. However, we will see that in some situations it can be quite
useful to relax these hypothesis and consider general constraints, that is constraints without
the restrictions above. General constraints naturally occur when considering security prob-
lems involving several non-communicating Dolev-Yao intruders (see  2.1). Remark, that if
intruders can communicate during protocol execution, the model becomes attack-equivalent
to one with a unique Dolev-Yao intruder [21]. General constraints are also interesting for
modelling cryptographic protocols where some data (e.g. initial agent knowledge) are pa-
rameterized (see  2.2).
1.1 Contributions of the paper
First, we will show that as for the standard case, in this more general framework it is still
possible to derive an NP decision procedure for detecting attacks on a bounded number of
protocol sessions (Sections 5, 4). Second, our result extends previous ones by allowing the
usage of an associative commutative idempotent operator (Sections 3, 4) that can be used
for instance to model sets of nodes in XML document (see  2.3). Third, we will remark that
the satisﬁability procedure we obtain for general constraints is a non trivial extension of the
one for well-formed constraints by showing that this procedure cannot be extended to handle
operators with subterm convergent theories since satisﬁability gets undecidable in this case
(Appendix A). On the other hand it is known that satisﬁability remains decidable for the
standard case of well-formed constraints with the same operator properties [3]. Finally we
will sketch the potential applications of our results (Section 2).
1.2 Related works
The decision procedure for satisﬁability of constraint systems can be used to decide the
insecurity of cryptographic protocols with a bounded number of sessions [19]. In this do-
main, several works deviated from perfect cryptography assumption and started to consider
algebraic properties of functional symbols. For example properties of XOR operator and
exponentiation were considered in [6, 7, 10, 20] and together with homomorphic symbol in
[13]. Some algebraic properties (like associative and commutative symbol) make the insecu-
rity problem undecidable [5]. Due to decidability of constraint system with ACI symbol, the
problem of insecurity for protocols with ACI constructor is also decidable (under condition
of bounded number of sessions). Works [13, 14, 16, 17, 11, 4] we aware of do not cover the
case of general DY+ACI constraints
INRIA
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All the works listed above considered systems of constraints with two restrictions namely
knowledge monotonicity (left-hand side of a constraint is included into left-hand side of the
next one) and variable origination (variable appears ﬁrst in right-hand side of some con-
straint): this limitation is not impeding the solution of usual protocol insecurity problems
since the constraints generated with an active Dolev-Yao intruder are of the required type.
An attempt to swerve from so-called well-formed constraints was made by Mazaré [16].
He considered quasi well-formed constraint systems by relaxing the knowledge monotonic-
ity. Later, in his thesis [17], he raised a similar decidability problem, but now for general
constraint systems. He succeeded to ﬁnd a decision procedure for satisﬁability of general
constraint systems with the restriction that keys used for encryption are atomic. On the
other hand, no extension of the classical Dolev-Yao deduction system was proposed for
general constraint systems.
1.3 Acknowledges
The work presented in this paper was partially supported by the FP7-ICT-2007-1 Project
no. 216471, AVANTSSAR: Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-oriented
Architectures (http://www.avantssar.eu).
2 Motivating examples
2.1 Protocol analysis with several intruders
In the domain of security protocol analysis Dolev-Yao model is widely used in spite of its
limitations. We propose here to consider instead of a powerful intruder that controls the
whole network, non communicating several intruders with smaller controlled domains. We
give below an application of this model.
Let us suppose that four agents (A, B, C and D) intend to exchange messages (see
Figure 1). Some data possessed by these agents are supposed to be secret. The agents have
established communication channels between each other. Due to their layout (long distance
between the hosts) they have to transmit data through routers: messages sent by channel
AB, i.e. from A to B, (and vice versa, from B to A) will come through Routers 1 and 2; A
to C through 3, 6, 7; A to D through Router 3; B to C through 5; B to D through 4 and
7 and C to D through Router 8. Some routers are compromised (for example, the intruder
managed to install a malicious pre-programmed device controlling input and output channels
of every compromised router or malicious code); in our example routers under control of an
intruder are 2, 5 and 7. We assume that during message exchanges compromised routers
have no means to communicate: due to the network topology there is no communication
link between them, neither direct, nor via other routers. After a while, an intruder can
collect the knowledge of every compromised router (he can get back implanted malicious
devices and read their memory or, if it was a code, copy stored data). The speciﬁcation of
the protocol, which agents are going to execute, is known initially by the intruder, as well as
RR n° 7276
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Figure 1: Untrusted routers
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which agent will execute which role. So in this framework the security problem is to know
whether it is possible for the intruder to initially give instructions to compromised routers
(e.g. by reprogramming devices) to force honest agents to reveal a secret. More formally the
problem is to decide whether the secret data will be deducible from the gathered knowledge of
all compromised routers (devices memory) after some preprogrammed interactions between
compromised routers and honest agents.
More generally the problem input is a set of agents each given with a list of actions
it is supposed to execute. Every agent has communication channels with other ones. We
bind to every communication channel at most one active local intruder (several channels
can be controlled by the same intruder, some can be free from intruders). This binding
is also given. Every local intruder has initial knowledge. Intruder controlling a channel
can intercept a message passed on it thereby increasing his knowledge, and forge a message
(anything he can build from his current knowledge) to send to the endpoint of any channel
controlled by him. Local intruders cannot exchange messages during protocol execution but
only afterwards. The question posed is, given a set of secret data, whether there exists
a sequence of message exchanges between honest agents (which strictly follow the list of
actions) and local intruders such that at some point, from common knowledge of all local
intruders it is possible to deduce a secret data.
2.1.1 Formalizing the coordinated attack problem
To formalize the problem we introduce some notations and deﬁnitions. Let A be the set of
atoms representing elementary pieces of data: texts, public keys, names of agents, etc. Let
X be the set of variables, representing data holders, values (possibly composed) of which
are asked to be found. We deﬁne a term as in Def. 3.1: classically for protocol security
domain, we allow encryption, pairing, etc. Let T be the set of all possible terms. Let t
be a term. We deﬁne Vars (t) the set of all variables in t (see Def. 3.9). We call term t
a ground term, if Vars (t) = ∅. The set of ground terms is denoted by Tg. An equational
theory may be considered (in our case is commutativity, associativity and idempotence of
·). Every term t is supposed to have a unique normal form denoted by ptq. A term t is
normalized if t = ptq. Two terms p and q are equivalent, if ppq = pqq. Given a set of terms
T we deﬁne pTq = {ptq : t ∈ T}. More details are given in Section 3.
We deﬁne a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} (where xi ∈ X and ti ∈ T ) to be the
mapping σ : T → T , such that tσ is a term obtained by replacing, for all i, each occurrence
of variable xi by the corresponding term ti. The set of variables {x1, . . . , xk} is called the
domain of σ and denoted by dom (σ). If T ⊆ T , then by deﬁnition Tσ = {tσ : t ∈ T}.
A substitution σ is ground if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ti is ground. We will say that the
substitution σ is normalized, if ∀x ∈ dom (σ), xσ is normalized.
Agents We will call communicating parties agents. Every agent is identiﬁed by its name.
We denote a set of agent names as A.
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Channels Between two any agents a and b there exists a communication channel which
we denote as a ⇀ b. We will suppose, that channels are directed. Set of all channels denoted
as C.
A channel supports a queue of messages: for example, if a sends sequentially two messages
to b (via channel a ⇀ b), then b cannot process the second message before the ﬁrst one;
messages are stored in queue to be processed in order of arrival.
Agents behavior We deﬁne a protocol session PS = {〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k as a set of pairs of
an agent name and a ﬁnite list of actions to be executed by this agent1. We also suppose
that Vars (li) ∩ Vars (lj) = ∅, for all i 6= j (where Vars (·) is naturally extended on lists of
actions).
Every action is of type ?fr or !ts, where for the ﬁrst form
 f is an agent name, whom a message is to be received from;
 r is a term (a template for the message) expected to be received from f ;
and for the second
 t is an agent name, whom the message is expected to be sent to;
 s is a term (a template for the message) to be sent to t.
For any agent a ∈ A participating in the protocol session PS, let
〈
a, {ρi}i=1,...,k
〉
∈ PS.
Case 1. If ρ1 =?f1r1 then the ﬁrst action agent a can do, is to accept a message m,
admittedly from agent f1 on channel f1 ⇀ a, matching the pattern r1, i.e. such that
pr1σq = pmq for some substitution σ. Agent is blocked (does not execute any other
actions) by awaiting a message. If a receives a message that does not match the expected
pattern, then a terminates his participation in PS. Note, that no notiﬁcation is sent to the
sender, thus a sender continues his execution2. Once a has received message m matching the
pattern r1 with substitution σ, a moves to a state where the list of actions to be executed
is {ρiσ}i=2,...,k, with
ρσ =
{
?f (rσ), if ρ =?fr;
!t(sσ), if ρ =!ts.
We will say that an action ρ is ground, if in case of ρ =?fr, r is a ground term; or in case
of ρ =!ts, s is ground.
Case 2. If ρ1 is !t1s1 then the ﬁrst action of agent a is sending message s1 to agent t1
(i.e. putting it to channel a ⇀ t1) and then, moving to a state where {ρi}i=2,...,k has to be
executed.
1For simplicity, we suppose that for a protocol session, one agent can not have more than one list of
actions to execute, but this restriction can be relaxed.
2One of the way to model another behavior, is to explicitly provide for every sending a succedent receive
of an acknowledge message and for every receive a succedent send of an acknowledge message.
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Intruder model We assume that some communication channels are controlled by local
intruders and there is no channel controlled by two or more intruders.
Suppose, there are N local intruders. We identify intruders by their names: {Ii}i=1,...,N .
We introduce an intruders layout represented by a function ι : C 7→ I∪ {∅}, which gives an
information on what intruder controls given channel (channel a ⇀ b is free of intruders iﬀ
ι(a ⇀ b) = ∅).
Every intruder I has some initial knowledge K0I that is a set of ground terms.
Once an agent sends a message via a channel controlled by intruder, the intruder reads
it and blocks it. Reading the message means extending intruder's current knowledge with
this message.
An intruder controlling a channel can generate a message from his knowledge using his
deduction power and send it to its endpoint.
We introduce some formalism needed to specify the intruder capabilities:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A rule is a tuple of terms written as s1, . . . , sk → s, where s1, . . . , sk, s are
terms. A deduction system D is a set of rules.
From now to the end of this section rules are assumed to belong to a ﬁxed deduction
system D.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A ground instance of a rule d = s1, . . . , sk → s is a rule l = l1, . . . , lk → r
where l1, . . . , lk, r are ground terms and there exists σ  ground substitution, such that
li = siσ, ∀i = 1, . . . , k and r = sσ. We will also call a ground instance of a rule a ground
rule when there is no ambiguity.
Given two sets of ground terms E, F and a rule l→ r, we write E →l→r F iﬀ F = E∪{r}
and l ⊆ E, where l is a set of terms. We write E → F iﬀ there exists rule l → r such that
E →l→r F .
Deﬁnition 2.3. A derivation D of length n ≥ 0 is a sequence of ﬁnite sets of ground terms
E0, E1, . . . , En such that E0 → E1 → · · · → En, where Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} ,∀i = {1, . . . , n}. A
term t is derivable from a set of terms E iﬀ there exists a derivation D = E0, . . . , En such
that E0 = E and t ∈ En. A set of terms T is derivable from E, iﬀ every t ∈ T is derivable
from E. We denote Der (E) set of terms derivable from E.
Local intruder I can send a messagem, ifm ∈ Der (KI), whereKI is a current knowledge
of intruder I.
Protocol session execution Now, having a protocol session, intruders layout and theirs
initial knowledges, we can present a course of a protocol execution. First, we will introduce
an execution under some constraints. This kind of execution we will call symbolic. And
then, once the constraints are satisﬁed, we deal with an eﬀective execution.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Let E be a set of terms and t be a term, we deﬁne the couple (E, t) denoted
E B t to be a constraint. A constraint system is a set
S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
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where n is an integer and Ei B ti is a constraint for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We extend the deﬁnition of Vars (·) to constraint system S in a natural way. We will say
that S is normalized, if every term occurring in S is normalized. As pSq we will denote a
constraint system {pEiq B ptiq}i=1,...,n.
Deﬁnition 2.5. A ground substitution σ is a solution of constraint E B t (or σ satisﬁes
this constraint), if ptσq ∈ Der (pEσq). A ground substitution σ is a solution of a constraint
system S, if it satisﬁes all the constraints of S and dom (σ) = Vars (S).
Deﬁnition 2.6. A conﬁguration Π of a protocol session is a tuple 〈PS,K,Q,S〉, where
K = {〈Ii,Ki〉}i=1,...,N represents current knowledges of intruders, and Q = {〈c,mc〉}c∈C is
a conﬁguration of channels: for every channel c queue of messages mc is given.
For any substitution σ we deﬁne〈
{〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k , {〈Ii,Ki〉}i=1,...,N , {〈c,mc〉}c∈C , {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
〉
σ
as 〈
{〈ai, liσ〉}i=1,...,k , {〈Ii,Kiσ〉}i=1,...,N , {〈c,mcσ〉}c∈C , {Eiσ B tiσ}i=1,...,n
〉
where application of a substitution on a list is deﬁned in a natural way.
Then we deﬁne a set of conﬁguration transitions in Table 1:
1. 〈{〈a, (?fr).la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K〉} ∪ K,Q,S〉 ι(f⇀a)=I−−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K〉} ∪ K,Q,S ∪ {K B r}〉
2. 〈{〈a, (!ts).la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K〉} ∪ K,Q,S〉 ι(a⇀t)=I−−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K ∪ s〉} ∪ K,Q,S〉
3. 〈{〈a, (!ts).la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈a ⇀ t,ma⇀t〉} ∪ Q,S〉 ι(a⇀t)=∅−−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈a ⇀ t,ma⇀t.s〉} ∪ Q,S〉
4. 〈{〈a, (?fr).la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a, s.mf⇀a〉} ∪ Q,S〉 ι(f⇀a)=∅−−−−−−−→psσq=prσq
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a,mf⇀a〉} ∪ Q,S〉σ
Note, that for transitions if we write {x} ∪ Y it implicitly means x /∈ Y .
Table 1: Conﬁguration transitions
Deﬁnition 2.7. A sequence of conﬁgurations obtained by application of transitions to the
initial conﬁguration
〈
PS,
{〈
I,K0I
〉}
I∈I , {〈c, ∅〉}c∈C , ∅
〉
is a symbolic execution of protocol
session PS under conditions of intruders ι.
An execution EPS = {Ciσ}i=1,...,m is an instance of symbolic execution {Ci}i=1,...,m
(where Ci = 〈PSi,Ki,Qi,Si〉) such that all terms of Ciσ are ground and Sm is satisﬁed by
σ.
INRIA
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Oine communication After a protocol session is executed, the current knowledge of all
local intruders will be gathered to derive a secret, which, probably, separately they cannot
deduce.
Coordinated attack problem Now we can formally state the problem.
Input: Given a ﬁnite set of agents A, protocol session PS = {〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k, a set of
intruders I = {Ii}i=1,...,N with its initial knowledges K0Ii , intruder layout ι and sensitive
data, represented by a ﬁnite set of ground terms S.
Output: Find out, whether exists s ∈ S and an execution EPS of protocol session PS with
its last conﬁguration 〈PS,K,Q,S〉 such that s ∈ Der
(⋃
〈KI ,I〉∈KKI
)
.
2.1.2 Solving the problem
We will consider another mode (let us call it constraint mode) of symbolic execution. Instead
of Transition 4 (Table 1) we will consider the following transition:
〈{〈a, (?fr).la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a, s.mf⇀a〉} ∪ Q,S〉 ι(f⇀a)=∅−−−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a,mf⇀a〉} ∪ Q,S ∪ {{enc (sσ, k)}B enc (rσ, k)}〉
Given a coordinated attack problem input, a set of possible executions obtained from sym-
bolic executions in original mode (symbolic execution using transitions in Table 1) coincides
with a set of possible executions obtained from symbolic executions in constraint mode. This
is due to the fact that pt1σq = pt2σq iﬀ σ is a solution of enc (t1, k) B enc (t2, k) (for any
term k), i.e. pt1σq = pt2σq ⇐⇒ penc (t1, k)σq ∈ Der ({penc (t2, k)σq}). And as the
question of the problem concerns to executions, a usage of two modes is equivalent, and we
will consider symbolic executions of constraint mode in this paragraph.
Assume that s is the sensitive datum that one has to check whether it can be revealed
by a coordinated attack.
As every execution deﬁnes a sequence of actions executed by honest agents, we can guess
the length of this sequence (this number is bounded) as well as an interleaving of actions for
all the agents preserving order inside every list of actions (this is also bounded): we build a
list of tuples in form 〈Ai, ρi〉. In this way we build an execution skeleton.
Thus, the initial problem is reduced to the following: Given a sequence of pairs (agent,
list of actions to be executed) E = {〈Ai, ρi〉}i=1,...,k, a sensitive datum s, intruders layout
ι and theirs initial knowledges K0I . Find out, if s can be revealed using the union of the
knowledge sets of all local intruders after some protocol execution.
Having this information, we build a corresponding symbolic execution in constraint
mode. Let its last conﬁguration be
〈
PS, {〈KI , I〉}I∈I ,Q,S
〉
. If constraint system S ∪{⋃
〈KI ,I〉∈KKI B s
}
is satisﬁable, then the protocol session is unsecure. The corresponding
steps are presented in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Building an execution
Input: E = {〈Ai, ρi〉}i=1,...,k, ι,
{
K0I ∈ Tg
}
I∈I, s ∈ Tg
Output: Execution of protocol session, if exists, otherwise ⊥
Build symbolic execution SE = {〈PSi,Ki,Qi,Si〉}i=1,...,k (in constraint mode)1
corresponding to E ;
if SE = ∅ (was not possible to build) then return ⊥ ;2
if Sk ∪
{⋃
〈KI ,I〉∈Kk KI B s
}
is satisﬁable with some σ then
3
return (SEσ)δ, where δ : Vars (SEσ) 7→ {a} for some a ∈ A4
else5
return ⊥6
end7
2.2 Synthesis of cooperation protocols
Another application of our decision procedure given in Section 3 is to solve the problem of
constructing agent cooperation protocols under condition of security policies.
We consider a set of agents that have to cooperate in order to achieve some given goal.
We assume that the agents can exchange messages through asynchronous communications
channels. Similar problems have often been addressed in previous works and solved by calling
to methods from automata synthesis, AI planning, or logic programming. Our objective here
is to contribute to the state of the art by solving some cases, not considered before, where the
structure of messages matters and where the security policy of each agent is an additional
constraint. It is a non trivial task to ﬁnd a cooperation scheme, as some agents may not
trust each other, they may have their own requirements to communicate, some intermediates
may be required to intervene (e.g. to provide certiﬁcates).
We abstract the communicating agents by specifying them solely by their initial knowl-
edge (what an agent knows in the beginning of the interaction) and their goals (what he
wants to obtain). The agent may create a new knowledge from what he knows at some point:
he may concatenate, encrypt, decrypt (if he knows the key), sign, etc. The agent ability to
cooperate takes the form of sending and receiving of messages. But some restrictions are to
be imposed: an agent may not accept any message, but only those with some pre-deﬁned
pattern (this expresses his policy). He can only send the messages he can create from his
knowledge. And last, the agent only sends messages to entities sharing a communication
channel (with appropriate direction) with him, according to the network topology.
Note, that nothing forbids us to parametrize agents initial knowledges, e.g. we can say,
that agent knows something encrypted with a given key, but we will not say what exactly.
And it is still up to the solution to indicate the values that instantiate the initial knowledge
of an agent.
We give an instance of the problem (see Figure 2): A writer (Agent A1) wants to publish
his new book (t). There is an enterprise which besides others services, has a Publishing
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Figure 2: Illustration for agents cooperation example
Service (Agent A4). This service accepts to print only books approved by a Writing Style
Authority (Agent A3). Anyone outside this enterprise is forbidden to access directly the
Printing Service. To get access one has to contact the Reception (Agent A2) of this
enterprise. The Reception can communicate to the Printing Service: they share a key, and
the Printing Service accepts only messages encrypted with that key.
The network topology here is as follows: A1, A2, A3 are pairwise connected (as they
represent public entities); A2 and A4 have also a communication channel (as they belong to
the same enterprise).
Agent A2 only accepts orders encrypted by his public key. Agents A1 and A3 can accept
everything (trivial policies are omitted on Figure 2). The question is how to cooperate to
print the book (A4 should obtain t)?
This problem can also be reduced to the satisﬁability of a general constraint system. For
the presented example, we can obtain a non-monotonic constraint system as follows:
{t, kA2}B x1; {kA3 ,priv (kA3) , x1}B x2;
{t, kA2 , x2}B aenc (x3, kA2) ;
{kA2 , kA2A4 ,priv (kA4) , aenc (x3, kA2)}B enc (pair (x4, sig (x4,priv (kA3))) , kA2A4) ;
{kA2 , kA3 , kA2A4 , enc (pair (x4, sig (x4,priv (kA3))) , kA2A4)}B t.

and its solution is {x1 7→ t; x2 7→ sig (t,priv (kA3)); x3 7→ pair (t, sig (t,priv (kA3))); x4 7→ t}.
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2.3 Attacks based on XML-representation of messages
Here we show how to model (using our formalism) attacks based on an XML-representation
of messages. A diﬀerent technique to handle this kind of attacks was presented in [8].
We consider an e-shop that accepts e-cheques, and we suppose that it is presented by a
Web Service using SOAP protocol for exchanging messages.
It has two layers:
 the ﬁrst layer exposes the list of goods for sale with their prices and process the orders
by accepting payment,
 the second layer is a delivery service, that receives information from the ﬁrst one about
successfully paid orders, and sends the ordered goods to the buyer.
A simple scenario for ordering item is shown in Figure 3. First, a client sends an order
using e-shop interface that consists of an item identiﬁer, e-cheque, delivery address and
some comments. Then, the ﬁrst layer of the e-shop checks whether the price of the ordered
item corresponds to the received cheque. If it does, the service uses the cheque and resends
the order to the stock/delivery service (without the used e-cheque). Stock and delivery
service prepare a parcel with ordered item and send it to given address. The comment is
automatically printed on the parcel to give some information to the postman about, for
example, delivery time or access instructions.
Suppose, Alice has an e-cheque for 5e. She selected a simple pen (with ItemID simple)
to buy, but she liked very much a more expensive gilded one (with ItemID gilded). Can we
help Alice to get what she wants for what she has?
Let us formalize the behaviour of scenario players (terms, normalization function and
deduction system are deﬁned as in  3.1.1 except that we will write (t1 · . . . · tn) instead
of · ({t1, . . . , tn})). Identiﬁers starting from a capital letter are considered as variables;
numbers and identiﬁer starting from lower-case letter are considered as constants. We model
a delivery of item with some ItemID to address Address with comments Comments by the
following message: sig ((ItemID ·Address ·Comments),priv (ks))  a message signed by
e-shop, where ks its public key, such that no one can produce this message except the shop.
We abstract away from the procedure of checking price of the item and will suppose, that
Shop Interface expects 5e e-cheque for Item simple.
We will use notation for sending and receiving as in  2.1.
For Shop Interface we have:
?Client(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm);
!Delivery(simple · IAddr · IComm).
For Shop Stock/Delivery we have:
?Interface(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm);
!Client sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks)) .
Alice initially has:
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Cl ient
Cl ient
Shop Interface
Shop Interface
Shop Stock
 + Del ivery
Shop Stock
 + Del ivery
ItemID,Cheque,Address,Comments
Check the price of item
 and use the cheque
ItemID,Address,Comments
Send ordered item to given Address
Figure 3: Ordering item scenario
simple, gilded: identiﬁers of items (for simplicity we suppose she knows only two of them);
cheque5: an e-cheque for 5e;
addr: her address;
cmnts: residence digital code;
ks: a public key of the shop.
Now we build a mixed constraint system (derivation constraints and equations) to know,
whether Alice can do what she wants:
{gilded, simple, cheque5, addr, cmnts, ks} B
(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm)
(simple · IAddr · IComm) =ACI(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm)
{gilded, simple, cheque5, addr, cmnts, ks,
sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks))} B
sig ((gilded · addr ·DComm),priv (ks))

(1)
(2)
(3)
Constraint (1) shows, that Alice can construct a message expected by the shop from a
client. Constraint (2) represents a request from the ﬁrst to the second layer of the shop:
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left-hand side is a message sent by the interface service, and right-hand side is a message
expected by stock/delivery subservice. The last constraint shows, that from the received
values Alice can build a message that models a delivery of item with ItemID gilded.
To solve it, we ﬁrst get rid of syntactic equations by applying most general uniﬁer; and
then of equations modulo ACI (t1 =ACI t2 is equivalent to pt1q = pt2q) by encoding them
into deduction rules (as it was done in  2.1.2).
Then, one of the solutions is:
IAddr 7→addr IComm 7→(gilded · cmnts)
DItemID 7→gilded DAddr 7→addr
DComm 7→(simple · cmnts)
From this solution we see, that Alice can send a not well-formed comments (that presents
two XML-nodes), and Delivery service parser can choose an entry with ID gilded. An attack-
request can look like this:
<ItemID>simple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d ed</ItemID>
The parser of the ﬁrst layer can return value of the ﬁrst occurance of ItemID (i.e.
simple). But the parser of the second one can return gilded.
This attack is possible, if Alice constructs a request by hand, but a similar attack is
probably feasible using XML-injection: Alice when ﬁlling a request form enters instead of
her comments the following string:
cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d ed</ItemID><Comments>
and in the resulting request we get:
<ItemID>simple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d ed</ItemID><Comments>
</Comments>
This kind of XML-injection attacks was described in [15].
3 Satisﬁability of general DY+ACI constraint systems
In Section 2 we reduced the problem of protocol insecurity in presence of several intruders to
solving a system of deducibility constraints. In this section we present a decision procedure
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for a constraint system where Dolev-Yao deduction system is extended by an associative-
commutative-idempotent symbol (DY+ACI). We consider operators for pairing, symmetric
and asymmetric encryptions, decryption, signature and an ACI operator that will be used
as a set constructor.
As for the proof structure, after introducing the formal notations, the main steps to show
the decidability are as follows:
1. We present an algorithm for solving a ground derivability in DY+ACI model.
2. We prove, that the normalization does not change satisﬁability: either we normalize a
solution or a constraint system.
3. We show existence of a conservative solution of satisﬁable constraint system: a substi-
tution σ that sends a variable to an ACI-set of quasi-subterms of the constraint system
instantiated with σ together with priv-ed atoms of the constraint system;
4. We give a bound on size of a conservative solution, and, as consequence, we obtain
decidability.
3.1 Formal introduction to the problem
3.1.1 Terms and notions
Deﬁnition 3.1. Terms are deﬁned according to the following grammar:
term ::= variable | atom | pair (term, term) |
enc (term, term) | ·(tlist) | priv (Keys) |
aenc (term,Keys) | sig (term,priv (Keys))
Keys ::= variable | atom
tlist ::= { term J, termK∗ }
where atom ∈ A, variable ∈ X and JxK∗ stands for 0 or more repetitions of x. We denote
T (A,X ) the set of all terms over a set of atoms A and a set of variables X . For short, we
write T instead of T (A,X ).
By sig (p,priv (a)) we mean a signature of message p with private key priv (a) We do not
assume that one can retrieve the message itself from the signature.
Note that we do allow complex keys for symmetric encryption only. As a consequence,
we have to introduce a condition on substitution applications: substitution σ cannot be
applied to the term t, if after replacing the resulting entity is not a term (for example, we
cannot apply σ = {x 7→ pair (a, b)} to the term aenc (a, x)).
We denote a term on i-th position of a list L as L[i]. Then t ∈ L is a shortcut for
∃i : t = L[i]. We also deﬁne two binary relations ⊆ and ≈ on lists as follows: L1 ⊆ L2 if
and only if ∀t ∈ L1 =⇒ t ∈ L2; L1 ≈ L2 if and only if L1 ⊆ L2 and L2 ⊆ L1, and naturally
extend them if L1 or L2 is a set.
RR n° 7276
18 Avanesov, Chevalier, Rusinowitch, Turuani
Deﬁnition 3.2. We consider symbol · to be associative, commutative, idempotent (shortly,
ACI).
We will use bin throughout the paper as a generalization of all binary operators: bin ∈
{enc, aenc,pair, sig}.
Deﬁnition 3.3. For every term t ∈ T we deﬁne its root symbol by
root (t) =

bin, if t = bin (p, q)
·, if t = · (L) ,
priv, if t = priv (p) ,
t, if t ∈ X ∪ A,
Deﬁnition 3.4. For any term t ∈ T we deﬁne its set of elements by:
elems (t) =
{⋃
p∈L elems (p) if t = · (L) ;
{t} , otherwise.
We extend elems () to sets of terms or lists of terms T by elems (T ) =
⋃
t∈T elems (t).
Example 1. Let us consider term t = · ({a, · ({b, a,pair (a, b)}) ,pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}). Set of
its elements is elems (t) = {a, b,pair (· ({b, b}) , a) ,pair (a, b)}
Deﬁnition 3.5. Let ≺ be a strict total order on T , such that comparing can be done in
polynomial time.
Deﬁnition 3.6. The cardinality of a set P is denoted by |P |.
Deﬁnition 3.7. The normal form of a term t (denoted by ptq) is recursively deﬁned by:
 ptq = t, if t ∈ X ∪ A
 pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (pt1q , pt2q)
 ppriv (t)q = priv (ptq)
 p· (L)q =

· (L′) , if |pelems (L)q| > 1 and L′ ≈ pelems (L)q
and for all i < j, L′[i] ≺ L′[j];
t′, if pelems (L)q = {t′}
,
where for set of terms T , pTq = {ptq : t ∈ T}.
We can show easily that two terms are congruent modulo the ACI properties of ′′.′′ iﬀ
they have the same normal form. Other properties are stated in Lemma 3.
Example 2. Referring to Example 1, we have ptq = · ({a, b,pair (a, b) ,pair (b, a)}).
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Deﬁnition 3.8. Let t be a term. We deﬁne a set of quasi-subterms QSub (t) as follows:
QSub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) ∪QSub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
{t} ∪⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p) , if t = · (L)
If T  set of terms, then QSub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T QSub (t). If S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n is a constraint
system, we deﬁne QSub (S) = ⋃t∈⋃ni=1 Ei∪{ti}QSub (t).
Example 3. Referring to Example 1, we have
QSub (t) = {· ({a, · ({b, a,pair (a, b)}) ,pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}) ,
a, b,pair (a, b) ,pair (· ({b, b}) , a) , · ({b, b})}.
Deﬁnition 3.9. Let t be a term. We deﬁne Vars (t) as set of all the variables in t:
Vars (t) = X ∩ Sub (t)
We deﬁne Sub(t) as the set of subterms of t and the DAG-size of a term, as the number
of its diﬀerent subterms. The DAG-size gives the size of a natural representation of a term
in the considered ACI theory.
Deﬁnition 3.10. Let t be a term. We deﬁne Sub (t) as follows:
Sub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
{t} ∪⋃p∈L Sub (p) , if t = · (L) .
If T is a set of terms, then Sub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T Sub (t). If S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n is a constraint
system, we deﬁne Sub (S) = ⋃t∈⋃ni=1 Ei∪{ti} Sub (t).
Example 4. Referring to Example 1, we have
Sub (t) = {· ({a, · ({b, a,pair (a, b)}) ,pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}) ,
· ({b, a,pair (a, b)}) ,pair (· ({b, b}) , a) ,
a, b,pair (a, b) , · ({b, b})}.
Deﬁnition 3.11. We deﬁne a DAG-size sizeDAG of a term t as sizeDAG (t) = |Sub (t)|,
for set of terms T , sizeDAG (T ) = |Sub (T )| and for constraint system S as sizeDAG (S) =
|Sub (S)|.
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Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q enc (t1, t2) , pt2q→ pt1q
t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q
t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q
t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q
t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq for all i
Table 2: DY+ACI deduction system rules
Remark, that for a constraint system such a deﬁnition does not polynomially approximate
a number of bits needed to write it down(cf. Def. 4.1).
We deﬁne a Dolev-Yao deduction system modulo ACI (denoted DY+ACI). It consists of
composition rules and decomposition rules, depicted in Table 2 where t1, t2, . . . , tm ∈ T .
We suppose, hereinafter, that for a constraint system S, QSub (S)∩A 6= ∅. Otherwise, we
can add one constraint {a}B a to S which will be satisﬁed by any substitution. We denote
{priv (t) : t ∈ T} for set of terms T as priv (T ). We deﬁne Vars (S) = ⋃ni=1 Vars (Ei) ∪
Vars (ti). We say that S is normalized, iﬀ ∀t ∈ QSub (S), t is normalized.
Example 5. We give a sample of general constraint system and its solution within DY+ACI
deduction system.
S =
{
enc (x, a) ,pair (c, a) B b
· ({x, c}) B a
}
,
where a, b, c ∈ A and x ∈ X .
One of the eventual solutions within DY+ACI is σ = {x 7→ enc (pair (a, b) , c)}.
Deﬁnition 3.12. Let T = {t1, . . . , tk} be a non-empty set of terms. Then we deﬁne pi(T )
as follows:
pi(T ) = p· (t1, . . . , tk)q
Remark: pi({t}) = ptq.
Deﬁnition 3.13. We denote QSub (S)\X as QS˚ub (S,X ) or, for shorter notation, QS˚ub (S).
We introduce a transformation pi(HS,σ (·)) on ground terms that replaces recursively all
binary root symbols such that they are diﬀerent from all the non-variable quasi-subterms
of the constraint system instantiated with its solution σ, with ACI symbol ·. Later, we will
show, that pi(H (σ)) is also a solution of S.
Deﬁnition 3.14. Let us have a constraint system S which is satisﬁable with solution σ. Let
us ﬁx some α ∈ (A∩QSub (S)). For given S and σ we deﬁne a function HS,σ (·) : Tg → 2Tg
as follows:
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HS,σ (t) =

{α} , if t ∈ (A \QSub (S));
{a} , if t = a ∈ (A ∩QSub (S));{
priv
(
pi(HS,σ (t1))
)}
, if t = priv (t1) ;{
bin
(
pi(HS,σ (t1)), pi(HS,σ (t2))
)}
, if t = bin (t1, t2)
ptq ∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq
HS,σ (t1) ∪HS,σ (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
∧ ptq /∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq⋃
p∈LH
S,σ (p) , if t = · (L) .
Henceforward, we will omit parameters and write H (·) instead of HS,σ (·) for shorter
notation.
Deﬁnition 3.15. We deﬁne the superposition of pi(·) and H (·) on a set of terms T =
{t1, . . . , tk} as follows: pi(H (T )) = {pi(H (t)) | t ∈ T}.
Deﬁnition 3.16. Let θ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} be a substitution. We deﬁne pi(H (θ)) the
substitution {x1 7→ pi(H (t1)), . . . , xk 7→ pi(H (tk))}.
Note, that dom (pi(H (θ))) = dom (θ).
Example 6. We refer to Example 5 and show, that pi(H (σ)) is also a solution of S. We
have pi(H (enc (pair (a, b) , c))) = pi(H (pair (a, b)) ∪ {c}) = pi({a} ∪ {b} ∪ {c}) = · ({a, b, c})
(we suppose that a ≺ b ≺ c). One can see, that pi(H (σ)) = {x 7→ · ({a, b, c})} is also a
solution of S within DY+ACI.
3.1.2 General properties used in proof
The two following lemmas state simple properties of derivability.
Lemma 1. Let A,B,C ⊆ Tg. Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and B ⊆ Der (C) then A ⊆ Der (C).
Lemma 2. Let A,B,C,D ⊆ Tg. Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and C ⊆ Der (D) then A ∪ C ⊆
Der (B ∪D).
In Lemma 3 we list some auxiliary properties that will be used in main proof.
Lemma 3. The following statements are true:
1. p· (t, t)q = ptq, p· (t1, t2)q = p· (t2, t1)q, p· (· (t1, t2) , t3)q = p· (t1, · (t2, t3))q =
= p· (t1, t2, t3)q
2. if t and tσ are terms, then ptσq = pptσqq = pptqσq = pt pσqq = pptq pσqq
3. s ∈ QSub (ptq) =⇒ s = psq
4. pelems (t)q = elems (ptq)
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5. p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q = p· (t1, . . . , tm)q; pi(T ) = pi(pTq)
6. elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) = elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ptiq)
7. H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p),
8. H (t) = H (ptq)
9. pi(H (t)) = pi(H (ptq)) = ppi(H (t))q = ppi(H (ptq))q
10. pi(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = pi({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)})
11. QSub (ptq) ⊆ pQSub (t)q
12. QSub (tσ) ⊆ QSub (t)σ ∪QSub (Vars (t)σ)
13. Sub (tσ) = Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ)
14. |pTq| ≤ |T |, |Tσ| ≤ |T |
15. elems (t) ⊆ QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t)
16. For term t, sizeDAG (ptq) ≤ sizeDAG (t); for set of terms T , sizeDAG (pTq) ≤
sizeDAG (T ); for constraint system S, sizeDAG (pSq) ≤ sizeDAG (S)
17. QSub (· (t1, . . . , tl)) ⊆ {· (t1, . . . , tl)} ∪QSub (t1) · · · ∪QSub (tl)
18. ∀s ∈ Sub (t) sizeDAG (ptσq) ≥ sizeDAG (psσq).
Proof. We will give proofs of several statements.
Statement 1: Follows from the deﬁnition of the normalization function and Deﬁnition 3.4.
Statement 3: By induction on sizeDAG (s). Let us ﬁx t.
 sizeDAG (s) = sizeDAG (ptq). Then s = ptq and psq = pptqq, and from State-
ment 2 (by taking empty σ) we have ptq = pptqq, and thus psq = s.
 Suppose, that for some k, for any s ∈ QSub (ptq), such that sizeDAG (s) > k,
s = psq.
 Consider case, where s ∈ QSub (ptq) and sizeDAG (s) = k. Then, by deﬁnition of
QSub (·), s is in
 priv (s) ∈ QSub (ptq). By induction supposition we have ppriv (s)q = priv (s),
and as ppriv (s)q = priv (psq), we have s = psq.
 bin (s, p) ∈ QSub (ptq). By induction we have pbin (s, p)q = bin (s, p), and
as pbin (s, p)q = bin (psq , ppq), we have s = psq.
 bin (p, s) ∈ QSub (ptq). The similar case.
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 s ∈ elems (· (L)),· (L) ∈ QSub (ptq). As sizeDAG (· (L)) > k, we have · (L) =
p· (L)q, that means (from Deﬁnition 3.7), that L is a list of normalized non-
ACI-set terms, and as elems (L) ≈ L, we have that s is normalized.
Statement 4: This statement is trivial, if t 6= · (L). Otherwise, let t = · (t1, . . . , tn).
 if pelems (t)q = {p}, where p 6= · (Lp). Then ptq = p and then elems (ptq) =
elems (p) = {p} = pelems (t)q.
 if pelems (t)q = {p1, . . . , pk}, k > 1, where pi 6= · (Li) for all i. Then ptq = · (L),
where L ≈ {p1, . . . , pk}. That means, that elems (ptq) =
⋃
p∈{p1,...,pk} elems (p) =
{p1, . . . , pk}.
Statement 5: The ﬁrst part follows from the deﬁnition of normal form and Statement 4.
The second one directly follows from the ﬁrst.
Statement 6: We get the ﬁrst part of equality if apply Statement 4:
elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) = pelems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq))q and then from Deﬁnition 3.4
and Statement 4 we have that elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)) is a set of normalized terms.
The second part directly follows from Deﬁnition 3.4.
Statement 7: By induction on sizeDAG (t).
 sizeDAG (t) = 1, implies t = a ∈ A and then elems (a) = {a}, i.e. the equality
becomes trivial.
 Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) holds.
 Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We shold prove H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
 t = priv (t1) or t = bin (p, q). In both cases, elems (t) = {t}, and thus, he
equality is trivial.
 t = · (L). Note, that ∀s ∈ L, sizeDAG (s) < k. Then, on one hand, H (· (L)) =⋃
p∈LH (p) = (by induction supposition) =
⋃
p∈L
⋃
p′∈elems(p)H (p
′). On the
other hand,
⋃
p∈elems(·(L))H (p) =
⋃
p∈⋃p′∈L elems(p′)H (p) =
=
⋃
p′∈L
⋃
p∈elems(p′)H (p). Thus, H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
Statement 8: By induction on sizeDAG (t):
 sizeDAG (t) = 1 is possible in the only case: t = a ∈ A and as a = paq, the
equality is trivial.
 Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), H (t) = H (ptq) holds.
 Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We need to prove that H (t) = H (ptq).
 if t = priv (t1), then H (t) = {priv (pi(H (t1)))} = (by induction supposition)
= {priv (pi(H (pt1q)))} = H (priv (pt1q)) = H (ptq).
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 if t = bin (p, q) and ptq ∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq. ThenH (ptq) = H (bin (ppq , pqq)) =
{bin (pi(H (ppq)), pi(H (pqq)))} = (by induction supposition)
= {bin (pi(pH (p)q), pi(pH (q)q))} = (by Statement 5)
= {bin (pi(H (p)), pi(H (q)))} = H (bin (p, q)).
 if t = bin (p, q) and ptq /∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq. Then H (t) = H (p) ∪H (q) = (by
induction supposition) = H (ppq) ∪ H (pqq) = (as pbin (ppq , pqq)q = ptq /∈
pQS˚ub (S)σq) = H (bin (ppq , pqq)) = H (ptq)
 if t = · (L), where L = {t1, . . . , tm}. Note ﬁrst, that as t = · (L), ∀s ∈
elems (t), sizeDAG (s) < sizeDAG (t). Then, by Statement 7, H (t) =
=
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) = (by induction supposition) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq). On
the other part, H (ptq) =
⋃
p∈elems(ptq)H (p) = (by Statement 4)
=
⋃
p∈pelems(t)qH (p) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq) = H (t).
Statement 9: This follows from Statements 8, 5, Deﬁnition 3.12 and from equality pptqq =
ptq (Statement 2).
Statement 10: From deﬁnition of pi and Statement 4, we have elems (pi(Ti)) = pelems (Ti)q.
Next pi({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)}) = p· (L)q (here we use p· (L)q to capture two cases from
deﬁnition of normalization at once), where L ≈ pelems ({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)})q =
= p
⋃
i=1,...,m pelems (Ti)qq = p
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (Ti)q, while pi(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = p· (L′)q,
where L′ ≈ p⋃i=1,...,m elems (Ti)q.
Statement 11: By induction on sizeDAG (t).
 sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then t ∈ A ∪ X . As QSub (t) = {t} and t = ptq, the statement
holds.
 Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), the statement is true.
 Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible cases:
 t = bin (t1, t2).On the one hand, QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2).
On the other hand, ptq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and then, QSub (ptq) = {ptq} ∪
QSub (pt1q) ∪ QSub (pt2q). Then, as QSub (ptiq) ⊆ pQSub (ti)q, we have
that QSub (ptq) ⊆ pQSub (t)q.
 t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
 t = · (L). We have QSub (t) = {t} ∪ ⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p). From defeni-
tion of normalization function we have elems (p· (L)q) = pelems (· (L))q, and
then, QSub (p· (L)q) = {p· (L)q} ∪ ⋃p∈elems(p·(L)q) QSub (p) = p{· (L)}q ∪⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (ppq) ⊆ (by supposition)
⊆ p{· (L)}q∪⋃p∈elems(·(L)) pQSub (p)q = p{· (L)} ∪⋃p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (p)q =
pQSub (t)q.
Statement 13: By induction on sizeDAG (t)
 sizeDAG (t) = 1.
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 t ∈ A. As tσ = t and Vars (t) = ∅, the statement becomes trivial.
 t ∈ X . Then Sub (t)σ = tσ, Vars (t) = {t}; and as for any term p, p ∈
Sub (p), we have Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪ Sub (tσ).
 Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), the statement is true.
 Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible cases:
 t = bin (t1, t2).Then tσ = bin (t1σ, t2σ) and Vars (t) = Vars (t1) ∪ Vars (t2).
Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪ Sub (t1σ) ∪ Sub (t2σ) = (as sizeDAG (ti) < k) = {tσ} ∪
Sub (t1)σ∪Sub (Vars (t1)σ)∪Sub (t2)σ∪Sub (Vars (t2)σ) = {tσ}∪Sub (t1)σ∪
Sub (t2)σ ∪ Sub ((Vars (t1) ∪Vars (t2))σ) = Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
 t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for case above.
 t = · ({t1, . . . , tm}).
We have tσ = · ({t1σ, . . . , tmσ}) and Vars (t) =
⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti). Then
we have Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪ ⋃i=1,...,m Sub (tiσ) = (as sizeDAG (ti) < k) =
{tσ}∪⋃i=1,...,m (Sub (ti)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (ti)σ)) = {tσ}∪⋃i=1,...,m Sub (ti)σ∪
Sub
((⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti)
)
σ
)
= Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
Lemma 4. Given a constraint system S and its solution σ. Then substitution pi(H (σ)) is
normalized
Proof. For any x ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))), xpi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)) = ppi(H (xσ))q (by Lemma 3).
Lemma 5. For any normalized term t, QSub (t) = Sub (t).
Proof. By induction on sizeDAG (t).
 sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then t ∈ X ∪ A, and thus, QSub (t) = Sub (t) = {t}.
 Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), QSub (t) = Sub (t).
 Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We need to show that QSub (t) = Sub (t).
 t = bin (t1, t2). Then QSub (bin (t1, t2)) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2) = (as
sizeDAG (ti) < k) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) = Sub (t)
 t = priv (t1). Then QSub (priv (t1)) = {t} ∪QSub (t1) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) = Sub (t)
 t = · (L). As t is normalized, ∀p ∈ L, p 6= · (Lp). Then elems (L) ≈ L. Thus,
we have QSub (t) = {t} ∪ ⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p) = {t} ∪ ⋃p∈L QSub (p) = {t} ∪⋃
p∈L Sub (p) = Sub (t).
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In Proposition 1 we remark, that ACI-set of normalized terms has the same deductive
expressiveness as that set of normalized terms itself.
Proposition 1. Let T be a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tk}. Then pi(T ) ∈ Der (pTq) and
pTq ⊆ Der ({pi(T )}).
In Proposition 2 we state that a constraint system and its normal form have the same
solutions. In Proposition 3 we show the equivalence, for a constraint system, between the
existence of a solution and the existence of a normalized solution. As a consequence we will
need only to consider normalized constraints and solutions in the sequel.
Proposition 2. The substitution σ is a solution of constraint system S if and only if σ is
a solution of pSq.
Proof. By deﬁnition, σ is a solution of S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n, iﬀ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , ptiσq ∈
Der (pEiσq). But by Lemma 3 we have that ptiσq = pptiqσq and pEiσq = ppEiqσq. Thus,
σ is a solution of S if and only if σ is a solution of pSq.
Proposition 3. The substitution σ is a solution of constraint system S if and only if pσq
is a solution of S.
Proof. Proof is similar to one of Proposition 2.
3.2 Ground case of DY+ACI
In Algorithm 3 we need to check whether a ground substitution σ satisﬁes a constraint
system S. For this, we have to check the derivability of a ground term from a set of ground
terms. In this subsection we present such an algorithm.
First, for the ground case we consider an equivalent to DY+ACI deduction system
DY+ACI' obtained from the ﬁrst by replacing a set of rules
∀i · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq
with
∀s ∈ elems (t) t→ psq , if t = · (L) .
Now, we show an equivalence of the two deduction systems.
Lemma 6. t ∈ DerDY+ACI (E) ⇐⇒ t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E)
Proof sketch. We show that every rule of one deduction system can be simulated by a com-
bination of rules from the other. It is suﬃcient to show it for non common rules.
The DY+ACI' rules ∀s ∈ elems (t) t → psq , if t = · (L) are modeled by succesive
application of rules ∀i · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq. The converse simulation of · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq
by DY+ACI' is based on getting all the normalized elements of ti and, if |pelems (ti)q| ≥ 2
then reconstructing ptiq by rule p1, . . . , pl → p· (p1, . . . , pl)q, where p1, . . . , pl are pelems (ti)q.
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Algorithm 2: Verifying derivability of term
Input: A normalized ground constraint E B t
Output: t ∈ DerDY+ACI (E)
Let S := QSub (E) ∪QSub (t) \ E;1
Let D := E;2
while true do3
if exists DY rule l→ r, such that l ⊆ D and r ∈ S then4
S := S \ {r};5
D := D ∪ {r};6
else7
if exists s ∈ S : elems (s) ⊆ D then8
S := S \ {s};9
D := D ∪ {s};10
else11
if exists s ∈ D : elems (s) * D then12
S := S \ elems (s);13
D := D ∪ elems (s);14
else15
return t ∈ D;16
end17
end18
end19
end20
Lemma 7. For Algorithm 2 the following statements are true:
 for any step3, D ∪ S = QSub (E ∪ {t}) and D ∩ S = ∅;
 it terminates;
 for any step, D ⊆ DerDY+ACI (E).
The following lemmas will be used to prove correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 8.
 For any decomposition rule l → r of DY+ACI', if l is normalized, then r is a quasi-
subterm of l.
 For any composition rule l → r of DY+ACI' except {t1, . . . , tm} → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q, if
l is normalized, then l ⊆ QSub (r).
3Consider two sequential assignments as one step
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Lemma 9. After the execution of Step 16 of Algorithm 2, if l→ r is a DY+ACI' rule, such
that l ⊆ D and r /∈ D, then l→ r is a composition rule and r /∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Proof. Suppose, l → r is a decomposition. By Lemma 8 we have that r ∈ QSub (l) and
thus, r ∈ QSub (D) ⊆ D∪S. Then r /∈ D implies r ∈ S, and then, Step 16 must be skipped,
as branch 4 or 12 should have been visited.
Thus, l→ r is a composition. As algorithm reached Step 16, that means r /∈ S (otherwise
one of three branches must be visited and this step would be skipped). As r /∈ S and r /∈ D,
we have r /∈ S ∪D = QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Lemma 10. Given a set of normalized terms S such that for any s ∈ S, elems (s) ⊆ S.
Then for any DY+ACI' composition rule l→ r such that l ⊆ S we have elems (r) ⊆ S∪{r}.
Proof. All cases of composition rules except t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q are trivial, as for
them elems (r) = {r}. For this case, as elems (ti) ⊆ S for all i, then (by Lemma 3, statement
6) elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) = elems (· (t1, . . . , tm)) =
⋃m
i=1 elems (ti) ⊆ S.
Proposition 4. Algorithm 2 is correct.
Proof. If algorithm returns true, then by Lemma 7 we have t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E).
Show, that output is correct, if algorithm returns false. Note, that we consider values of
D and S that they have after ﬁnishing the algorithm. Suppose that output is false (t /∈ D),
but t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E). Then there exists minimal by length derivation {Ei}i=0,...,n where
n ≥ 1, D = E0 (as D ⊆ DerDY+ACI′ (E) and t /∈ D) and t ∈ En and Ei+1 \ Ei 6= ∅ and
Ei →li→ri Ei+1 for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Then, applying Lemma 9 we have l0 → r0 is a
composition, and r0 /∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Let m be the smallest index such that there exists s ∈ S = QSub (E ∪ {t}) \ D and
s ∈ Em.
Let k be the minimal integer, such that lk → rk is a decomposition.
Show, k ≤ m. Suppose the opposite, then s is built by a chain of composition rules from
D. If lm−1 → rm−1 (where rm−1 = s) is
 a rule in form of {t1, . . . , tc} → p· (t1, . . . , tc)q, then elems (s) 6= {s} (otherwise it
contradicts to minimality of the derivation) and by Lemma 10, elems (s) ⊆ Em−1
(m 6= 1, otherwise this step would be executed in the algorithm). As s ∈ S, then
elems (s) ⊆ QSub (s) ⊆ QSub (E ∪ {t}). If elems (s) ⊆ D then we got contradiction
with with the fact, that this step would be executed in the algorithm. If there exists
e ∈ elems (s) and e /∈ D (that means, e ∈ S), then we get a contradiction with the
minimality of m, as e ∈ S was deduced before.
 any other composition rule, then by Lemma 8, lm−1 ⊆ QSub (s), and thus, lm−1 ⊆
D ∪ S. Similarly to the previous case, m 6= 1 and we get a contradiction with either
minimality of m, or with the fact, that the algorithm would have to add s into D.
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Note, that this also shows, that decomposition rule is present in derivation.
Show, lk * D. Suppose the opposite. Then by Lemma 8, we have rk ⊆ D what
contradicts to Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅. Thus, at least one element from lk is not from D. Let us
consider all possible decomposition rules lk → rk:
 {pair (t1, t2)} → pt1q. We know, that pair (t1, t2) is not in D, thus, it was built
by composition. As Ei are normalized, the only possible way to build by compo-
sition pair (t1, t2) from normalized terms is {t1, t2} → pair (t1, t2) (other ways, like
pair (t1, t2) ,pair (t1, t2) → p· ({pair (t1, t2) ,pair (t1, t2)})q would contradict the mini-
mality of the derivation). Thus, t1 was derived before (or was in D), i.e. t1 ∈ Ek.
That contradicts to Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅.
 {pair (t1, t2)} → pt2q. Similar case.
 {enc (t1, t2) , pt2q} → pt1q. The case where enc (t1, t2) /∈ D has similar explanations as
two cases above. Thus, enc (t1, t2) ∈ D. That means, t2 ∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}) and t2 /∈ D,
i.e. t2 ∈ S. This means, t2 was derived before and t2 ∈ S, what contradicts to k ≤ m.
 {aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q} → pt1q is a similar case to previous one. Note, that if
priv (t2) is not in D, that it must be obtained by decomposition.
 t → psq, where s ∈ elems (t) and t = · (L). By Lemma 10, elems (t) ⊆ Ek, that
contradicts minimality of derivation (Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅).
3.3 Existence of conservative solutions
In this subsection we will show that for any satisﬁable constraint system, there exist a
solution in special form (so called conservative solution). Roughly speaking, a solution in
this form can be deﬁned per each variable by set of quasi-subterms of the constraint system
and set of atoms (also from the constraint system) that must be prived. This will bound a
search space for the solution (see  3.4).
First, we show, that on quasi-subterms of constraint system instantiated with its solution,
the transformation pi(H (·)) will be a homomorphism modulo normalization.
Proposition 5. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized solution σ. For
all t ∈ QSub (S), pt pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (tσ))q.
Proof. We will prove it by induction on |Sub (t)|, where t is normalized.
 Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then:
 either t ∈ A. In this case t ∈ (A ∩QSub (S)), and as tµ = t for any substitution
µ, then pi(H (tσ)) = pi(H (t)) = pi({t}) = t and t pi(H (σ)) = t. Thus, t pi(H (σ)) =
pi(H (tσ)).
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 or t ∈ X . As σ is a solution and t ∈ QSub (S), we have t ∈ dom (σ), and,
by deﬁnition, t ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))). Then, by deﬁnition of pi(H (σ)), t pi(H (σ)) =
pi(H (tσ)).
 Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then pt pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (tσ))q.
 Show, that for any t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q) or t = priv (q)
or t = · (t1, . . . , tm), but |Sub (p)| ≤ k, |Sub (q)| ≤ k and |Sub (ti)| ≤ k, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, statement pt pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (tσ))q is still true. We have:
 either t = bin (p, q). As t = bin (p, q) ∈ QSub (S) ⇒ p ∈ QSub (S) and q ∈
QSub (S). As |Sub (p)| < |Sub (t)| and from the induction assumption, we have
pp pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (pσ))q. The same holds for q.
Again, as bin (p, q)σ ∈ QS˚ub (S)σ (as bin (p, q) /∈ X and t ∈ QSub (S)) we have
that ppi(H (bin (p, q)σ))q = ppi(H (bin (pσ, qσ)))q = ppi(H (pbin (pσ, qσ)q))q =
ppi(H (bin (ppσq , pqσq)))q = ppi({bin (pi(H (ppσq)), pi(H (pqσq)))})q =
= ppi({bin (ppi(H (pσ))q , ppi(H (qσ))q)})q = pbin (ppi(H (pσ))q , ppi(H (qσ))q)q =
pbin (pp pi(H (σ))q , pq pi(H (σ))q)q = pbin (p pi(H (σ)), q pi(H (σ)))q =
= pbin (p, q)pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q.
 or t = · (t1, . . . , tm). As t is normalized, it implies that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti are
not in form of · (Li) and then ti ∈ QSub (S), and thus, we have ti ∈ QSub (S) ∧
ppi(H (tiσ))q = pti pi(H (σ))q. pi(H (tσ)) = pi(H (· (t1σ, . . . , tmσ))) = pi(H (t1σ) ∪
· · ·∪H (tmσ)) = (by Statement 10 of Lemma 3) = pi({pi(H (t1σ)), . . . , pi(H (tmσ))}) =
pi({pt1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm pi(H (σ))q}) = p· (pt1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm pi(H (σ))q)q =
p· (t1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , tm pi(H (σ)))q = p(· (t1, . . . , tm))pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q
 or t = priv (q). Then q ∈ QSub (S).
pi(H (tσ)) = pi({priv (pi(H (qσ)))}) = ppriv (pi(H (qσ)))q = ppriv (q pi(H (σ)))q =
ppriv (q)pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q.
Thus, the proposition is proven.
Now we show, that relation of derivability between a term and a set of terms is stable
with regard to transformation pi(H (·)).
Lemma 11. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized solution σ. For
any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, pi(H (r)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (l1)), . . . , pi(H (lk))}).
. Let us consider all the cases of DY+ACI rules:
 t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q We have two cases:
 ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) =
pi(H (pair (pt1q , pt2q))) = pi({pair (pi(H (pt1q)), pi(H (pt2q)))}) =
= ppair (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2)))q and then
pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))}).
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 @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then (by deﬁnition, Lemma 3
and Proposition 1)
pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) = pi(H (pt1q) ∪H (pt2q)) ∈ Der (pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q). By
Proposition 1, pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (t1))}) and pH (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (t2))}),
then by Lemma 2, pH (t1)q ∪ pH (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (t1))} ∪ {pi(H (t2))}). Now,
by applying Lemma 1, we have that
pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1))} ∪ {pi(H (t2))}).
So, in this case pi(H (r)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (l1)), pi(H (l2))}).
 t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of previous one.
 {t1, t2} → paenc (t1, t2)q. The same.
 t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
 ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q = puσq. Then
pi(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) = pi(H (sig (t1,priv (t2)))) =
pi({sig (pi(H (pt1q)), pi(H (ppriv (t2)q)))}) = psig (pi(H (t1)),priv (pi(H (t2))))q
and then pi(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1)), pi(H (priv (t2)))}) (as
pi(H (priv (t2))) = priv (pi(H (t2)))).
 @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q = puσq. This case can be proved in
similar way as done for {t1, t2} → ppair (t1, t2)q.
 t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q. On one hand, pi(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) =
pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)) ∈ Der (pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q). On
the other hand, pH (ti)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (ti))}). And thus, by Lemma 2,
pi(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1)), . . . , pi(H (tm))}).
 enc (t1, t2) , pt2q → pt1q. Here we have to show that pi(H (pt1q)) is derivable from
{pi(H (enc (t1, t2))), pi(H (pt2q))}. Consider two cases:
 ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then pi(H (enc (t1, t2))) =
enc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and then pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({enc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) , ppi(H (pt2q))q}).
 @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then pi(H (enc (t1, t2))) =
pi(H (t1) ∪H (t2)). Using Proposition 1, we have
pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))}). Thus (by Lemma 3) pH (t1)q ⊆
Der ({pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Proposition 1 we have that pi(H (t1)) ∈
Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 1, we have pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈
Der (pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))).
 aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q → pt1q. Here we have to show that pi(H (pt1q)) is derivable
from {pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))), pi(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two cases:
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 ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and then pi(H (pt1q)) =
pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der ({aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) , ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q}). On the other
hand, pi(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = pi(H (priv (t2))) = pi({priv (pi(H (t2)))}) =
ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q.
 @u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪H (t2)). Using Proposition 1, we have
pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus (by Lemma 3)
pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Proposition 1 we have
that pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 1, we have
pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
 pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Here, as usual, we consider two cases:
 ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pair (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and then
pi(H (pt1q)) = ppi(H (t1))q ∈ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}).
 @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪H (t2)). Then by Proposition 1, we have
pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}), thus
pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Proposition 1 we have that
pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 1, we have
pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))).
 pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Proof like above.
 · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq. We have pi(H (· (t1, . . . , t2))) = pi(H (t1)∪· · ·∪H (tm)). Then by
Proposition 1, pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q ⊆ Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))); and then pH (ti)q ⊆
Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))). As pi(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pH (ti)q), by Lemma 1 we have
pi(H (ptiq)) = pi(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , t2)))).
As all possible cases satisfy lemma conditions, we proved the lemma.
Using Proposition 5 and Lemma 11 we will show, that transformation pi(H (·)) preserves
the property of substitution to be a solution.
Theorem 1. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized solution σ. Then
substitution pi(H (σ)) also satisﬁes S.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n. Let us take any constraint
(E B t) ∈ S. As σ is a solution of S, there exists a derivation D = {A0, . . . , Ak} such that
A0 = pEσq and ptσq ∈ Ak.
By Lemma 11 and Lemma 2 we can easily prove that if k > 0, then pi(H (Aj)) ⊆
Der (pi(H (Aj−1))), j = 1, . . . , k. Then, applying transitivity of Der (·) (Lemma 1) k times,
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we have that pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))). In the case where k = 0, the statement
pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))) is also true.
Using Proposition 5 we have that pi(H (A0)) = pi(H (Eσ)) = pE pi(H (σ))q, as E ⊆
QSub (S). The same for t: pi(H (tσ)) = pt pi(H (σ))q, and as ptσq ∈ Ak, we have pt pi(H (σ))q ∈
pi(H (Ak)). Thus, we have pt pi(H (σ))q ∈ pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))) = Der (pE pi(H (σ))q),
that means pi(H (σ)) satisﬁes any constraint of S.
From now till the end of subsection we will study a very useful property of pi(H (σ)).
Proposition 6 and its corollary show, that if constraint system has a normalized solution
(σ) which sends diﬀerent variables to diﬀerent values, then there exists another normalized
solution (pi(H (σ))) that sends any variable of its domain to an ACI-set of some non-variable
quasi-subterms of constraint system instantiated by itself and some private keys built with
atoms of the constraint system.
Lemma 12. If puσq = enc (p, q), σ is normalized, u = puq and u /∈ X and xσ 6= yσ, x 6= y
then ∃s ∈ QSub (u) such that s = enc (p′, q′) and psσq = enc (p, q). The similar is true in
the case of puσq = pair (p, q), puσq = aenc (p, q), puσq = sig (p, q) and for puσq = priv (p).
Proof. As u = puq and puσq = enc (p, q), we have:
 u not in form of · (L). Then, as u /∈ X and puσq = enc (p, q), we have u = enc (p′, q′)
(where pp′σq = p and pq′σq = q). Then we can choose s = enc (p′, q′) = u ∈ QSub (u).
 u = · (t1, . . . , tm), m > 1, as u = puq. Then, for all i, ti is either a variable, or
enc (p′i, q
′
i). But, as xσ 6= yσ, x 6= y and as σ is normalized, we can claim, that
{t1, . . . , tm} contains at most one variable. Then, as m > 1, there exists i such that
ti = enc (p
′
i, q
′
i). Then by deﬁnition of normalization function, and from puσq =
enc (p, q) we have, that pelems (uσ)q = {enc (p, q)} and as tiσ is an element of uσ, we
have penc (p′i, q′i)σq = enc (p, q). Thus, we can choose s = ti, as ti ∈ QSub (u) and
ti = enc (p
′
i, q
′
i).
The other cases (pair, priv, etc...) can be proved similarly.
Proposition 6. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized solution σ
such that ∀x, y ∈ dom (σ), x 6= y =⇒ xσ 6= yσ. Then ∀x ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))) ∃k ∈ N
∃s1, . . . , sk ∈ QS˚ub (S) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) such that root (si) 6= · and
xpi(H (σ)) = pi({s1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , sk pi(H (σ))}).
Proof. By deﬁnition, xpi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)). Let us take any s ∈ H (xσ) (note, that s is a
ground term). Then, by deﬁnition of H (·) we have:
 either s ∈ A. Then, by deﬁnition of H (·), s ∈ (A ∩QSub (S)). Thus, s pi(H (σ)) = s,
s ∈ QS˚ub (S), s 6= · (L);
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 or s = bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that
puσq = pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (pt1q , pt2q). As all conditions of Lemma 12 are satisﬁed,
∃v ∈ QSub (u) such that pvσq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and v = bin (p, q) and as
u ∈ QS˚ub (S) then v ∈ QS˚ub (S). By Proposition 5,
pv pi(H (σ))q = pi(H (vσ)) = pi(H (pvσq)) = pi(H (bin (t1, t2))) =
pi({bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2)))}) = bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) = s. That means,
∃v ∈ QS˚ub (S) , v 6= · (L) such that s = pv pi(H (σ))q.
 or s = priv (pi(H (t1))). In this case, as s is ground, pi(H (t1)) must be an atom,
moreover, by deﬁnition of H (·), this atom is from (A ∩QSub (S)). Therefore,
s = priv (a), where a ∈ A ∩QSub (S) (and of course, s 6= · (L)).
Thus, ∀s ∈ H (xσ), ∃v ∈ (QSub (S)) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) \ X | s = pv pi(H (σ))q.
Therefore, as xpi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)), we have that
xpi(H (σ)) = pi({ps1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , psk pi(H (σ))q}) = pi({s1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , sk pi(H (σ))}),
where s1, . . . , sk ∈ QS˚ub (S) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and si 6= · (L) ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. That proves
the proposition.
Corollary 1. Given normalized constraint system S and its normalized solution σ′ such
that x 6= y =⇒ xσ′ 6= yσ′. Then there exists a normalized solution σ of S such that ∀x ∈
dom (σ) ∃k ∈ N∃s1, . . . , sk ∈ QS˚ub (S)∪priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) , xσ = pi({s1σ, . . . , skσ}) and
si 6= sj, if i 6= j; si 6= · (L) ,∀i.
Any normalized solution with property shown in Corollary 1 we will call conservative.
3.4 Bounds on conservative solutions
To get a decidability result, we ﬁrst show an upper bound on size of conservative solution and
then, by reducing any satisﬁable constraint system to one that have conservative solution
and showing that reduced one is smaller (by size) than original one, we obtain an existence
of a solution with bounded size for any satisﬁable constraint system.
Lemma 13. Given a normalized constraint system S and its conservative solution σ. Then
∀x ∈ Vars (S) ,QSub (xσ) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
Proof. Given a ground substitution σ, let us deﬁne a strict total order on variables: x @
y ⇐⇒ (sizeDAG (xσ) < sizeDAG (yσ)) ∨ (sizeDAG (xσ) = sizeDAG (yσ) ∧ x ≺ y).
By Proposition 6 ∀x xσ = pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}), where
sxi ∈ (QSub (S) \ X ) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and sxi 6= · (L).
Let us show that if y ∈ Vars (sxi ) for some i, then y @ x. Suppose, that y ∈ Vars (sxi ) and
x @ y. Then sizeDAG (xσ) = sizeDAG (pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ})) = sizeDAG (p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q) ≥
(by Lemma 3) ≥ sizeDAG (psxi σq) > sizeDAG (pyσq), because we know that sxi = bin (p, q)
or sxi = priv (p) and y ∈ Vars (sxi ) (for example, in ﬁrst case, sizeDAG (psxi σq) =
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= sizeDAG (bin (ppσq , pqσq)) = 1 + sizeDAG ({ppσq , pqσq}) and as y ∈ Vars ({p, q}), us-
ing Statement 18 of Lemma 3, we get sizeDAG (psxi σq) ≥ 1 + sizeDAG (pyσq)) And as
sizeDAG (pyσq) = sizeDAG (yσ) That means, y @ x. Contradiction.
Now we show by induction the main property of this lemma.
 let x = min@(Vars (S)). Then xσ = pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}) = p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q and all
sxi are ground (as @y @ x). Then xσ = p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q. We have that QSub (xσ) =
{p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q}∪QSub (sx1)∪· · ·∪QSub (sxkx) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq∪priv (A ∩QSub (S)),
as ∀s ∈ QSub (sxi ), s ∈ Tg and s ∈ QSub (S) or s = priv (a) or s = a, where
a ∈ QSub (S) ∩ A, therefore s = psq = sσ ∈ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and
p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q = xσ ∈ pQSub (S)σq.
 Suppose, for all z @ y, QSub (zσ) ⊆ pQSub (Sσ)q ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
 Show, that QSub (yσ) ⊆ QSub (Sσ) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A). We know that yσ =
pi({sy1σ, . . . , sykyσ}) = p· (sy1σ, . . . , sykyσ)q and ∀z ∈ Vars (syi ) , z @ y. Then we have
QSub (yσ) = {yσ} ∪ QSub (psy1σq) ∪ · · · ∪ QSub (psykyσq). We know that yσ ∈
pQSub (S)σq. Let us show that QSub (psyi σq) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq∪priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
By Lemma 3 we have QSub (psyi σq) ⊆ pQSub (syi σ)q ⊆
⊆ pQSub (syi )σ ∪QSub (Vars (syi )σ)q = pQSub (syi )σq ∪ QSub (Vars (syi )σ). We can
see that pQSub (syi )σq ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) (as syi ∈ QSub (S) ∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A)); and by induction supposition and by statement proved above we
have QSub (Vars (syi )σ) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A). Thus, QSub (yσ) ⊆
pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
Proposition 7. For normalized constraint system S that have conservative solution σ,
∀x ∈ Vars (S) , sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S).
Proof. As |pSub (S)σq| ≤ |Sub (S)σ| ≤ |Sub (S)| = sizeDAG (S), we have (using the fact
that σ is normalized and Lemma 13) that |Sub (xσ)| = |QSub (xσ)| ≤ |pQSub (S)σq ∪
priv (A ∩QSub (S))| ≤ |pQSub (S)σq|+ |priv (A ∩QSub (S))| ≤ sizeDAG (S) +
+|A ∩QSub (S)| ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S); thus, sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S).
From this proposition and Corollary 1 we obtain an existence of bounded solution for
a normalized constraint system that have a solution sending diﬀerent variables to diﬀerent
values. We will reduce an arbitrary constraint system to already studied case. The target
properties are stated in Proposition 8 and Corollary 2.
Lemma 14. Given any constraint system S and any substitution θ such that dom (θ) =
Vars (S) and dom (θ) θ ⊆ dom (θ). Then sizeDAG (Sθ) ≤ sizeDAG (S).
Proof. By Lemma 3, sizeDAG (Sθ) = |Sub (Sθ)| = |Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ)|, but
Vars (S) θ ⊆ dom (θ) = Vars (S) (Vars (Sσ) consists only of variables), and then
Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Vars (S) θ. As Vars (S) ⊆ Sub (S), we have
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Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Sub (S) θ. Thus,
sizeDAG (Sθ) = |Sub (S) θ| ≤ |Sub (S)| = sizeDAG (S).
Deﬁnition 3.17. Let σ and δ be substitutions. Then σ[δ] is a substitution such that
dom (σ[δ]) = dom (δ) and ∀x ∈ dom (σ[δ]) , xσ[δ] = (xδ)σ.
Lemma 15. Let θ and σ be substitutions such that dom (θ) θ = dom (σ), dom (σ) ⊆ dom (θ)
and σ is ground. Then, for any term t, (tθ)σ = tσ[θ].
Proof. When apply θ to t, every variable x of t such that x ∈ dom (θ) is replaced by xθ;
then we apply σ to tθ: every variable y of tθ is replaced by yσ, thus, every variable x from
dom (θ) will be replaced to (xθ)σ (as dom (θ) θ = dom (σ)); and no other variables will be
replaced (as dom (σ) ⊆ dom (θ)). Thus, we can see that it is the same as in deﬁnition of
σ[θ].
Proposition 8. Given any satisﬁable constraint system S. Then there exists a solution σ
of S such that ∀x ∈ dom (σ) , sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq)
Proof. From proposition 2 and 3 we know that if σ′ is a solution of S then pσ′q is a solution of
S and pσ′q is a solution of pSq. Then, there exists a substitution θ : dom (θ) = dom (pσ′q),
dom (θ) θ ⊆ dom (θ) , σ′′ = pσ′q |dom(θ)θ and σ′′ is a solution of pSq θ such that xσ′′ 6= yσ′′,
if x 6= y (this is true because we can show how to build θ : given the pσ′q  simply split
dom (pσ′q) into the classes of equivalence modulo pσ′q, i.e. x ≡ y ⇐⇒ x pσ′q = y pσ′q; for
every class choose one representative [x]≡, and then xθ = [x]≡). Note, that θσ′′ = σ′, that's
why σ′′ is a solution of pSq θ.
Then, as σ′′ is a solution of pSq θ, using Proposition 2, we can say, that σ′′ is a solution
of ppSq θq. Moreover, xσ′′ 6= yσ′′, if ∀x, y ∈ dom (σ′′) x 6= y and σ′′ is normalized. Then, we
can apply Corollary 1, which gives us existence of conservative solution δ of ppSq θq. That is
why we can apply Proposition 7: ∀x ∈ Vars (ppSq θq) , sizeDAG (xδ) ≤ 2×sizeDAG (ppSq θq).
Note, that using Proposition 2, Lemma 15 and deﬁnition of solution, we can easily show
that δ[θ] is a solution of pSq. Moreover, δ[θ] is normalized. By deﬁnition of δ[θ] we can say,
that ∀x ∈ dom (δ[θ]) ∃y ∈ dom (θ) θ : xδ[θ] = yδ and as y ∈ X (by deﬁnition of θ), then
sizeDAG (xδ[θ]) = sizeDAG (yδ) ≤ 2 × sizeDAG (ppSq θq) ≤ 2 × sizeDAG (pSq θ). Applying
Lemma 14, we have sizeDAG (xδ[θ]) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq).
Summing up, we have a normalized solution σ = δ[θ] of pSq such that ∀x ∈ dom (σ),
sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq).
Corollary 2. Constraint system S is satisﬁable if and only if there exists a normalized solu-
tion of S deﬁned on Vars (S) which maps a variable to a ground term in T (A∩QSub (pSq) , ∅)
with size not greater than double sizeDAG (S).
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Using this result, we propose an algorithm of satisﬁability of constraint system (Algo-
rithm 3).
Algorithm 3: Solving constraint system
Input: A constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
Output: Model σ, if exists; otherwise ⊥
Guess for every variable of S a value of ground substitution σ with size not greater1
than 2× sizeDAG (S);
if σ satisﬁes Ei B ti for all i = 1, . . . , n then2
return σ3
else4
return ⊥5
end6
Proposition 9. Algorithm 3 is correct.
Proof. Let σ be an output of Algorithm 3. Then σ is a ground substitution and σ satisﬁes
all constraints from S ′ and therefore, satisﬁes all constraints from S . This means, σ is a
solution of S.
Proposition 10. Algorithm 3 is complete.
Proof. Suppose, S is satisﬁable. Then, by Corollary 2, there exists a guess of value of ground
substitution on every element of Vars (S) with size not greater than 2 × sizeDAG (S) which
represents a solution σ of S. Thus, algorithm 3 will return this σ.
4 Complexity analysis
In this section we present complexity classes of proposed algorithms. First, we expose what
we use as a representation of constraint systems to justify the selected measure of algorithms
inputs. Then, we notice that normalization algorithm is polynomial in time. After that
we will show the polynomial complexity of the ground derivability algorithm. And as a
consequence of the results given before, we obtain that the proposed algorithm for solving
general constraint system within DY+ACI model is in NP .
To reason about complexity, we have to deﬁne a size of its input. For terms and set of
terms, we will use sizeDAG (·). For system of constraints S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n we will use
n× sizeDAG (S). The justiﬁcation is given below.
Deﬁnition 4.1. DAG-representation of a constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n is a tagged
graph with labeled edges G = 〈V,E, tag〉 (V is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges; tag
is a tagging function deﬁned on V) such that:
 there exists a bijection f : V 7→ Sub (S);
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 ∀v ∈ V tag (v) = 〈s,m〉, where
 s = root (f(v));
 m is 2n-bit integer, where m[2i − 1] = 1 ⇐⇒ f(v) ∈ Ei and m[2i] = 1 ⇐⇒
f(v) = ti.
 v1
1−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ T : (∃bin : f(v1) = bin (f(v2), p)) ∨ f(v1) = priv (f(v2));
 v1
2−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ T : ∃bin : f(v1) = bin (p, f(v2));
 v1
i−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ f(v1) = · (L) ∧ L[i] = f(v2);
Example 7. A constraint system
S =
 {enc (a, x) ,pair (b, enc (a, a)) , c} Ba{priv (b) , c} By{enc (sig (a,priv (c)) , y) , aenc (x, b)} B pair (enc (a, x) , c)
will be represented as shown4 in Figure 4. Nodes of this graph represent an element from
Sub (S) by indicating its root symbol (ﬁrst part of its tag) and pointers to the children.
Remark, that this representation can be reﬁned, as we know that RHS of a constraint is
exactly one term. That is why we could tag a node not with 2n bits but with n+dlog(n+1)e
bits (concerning the second component of the tagging function).
As number of edges does not exceed a squared number of nodes, such a representation
takes not more than P (n × sizeDAG (S)) bits of space, where P is some polynomial with
non-negative coeﬃcients. On the other hand, as we are not interested in rigorous estimation
of complexity, but work in a polynomial class, we will measure complexity of algorithms by
taking n× sizeDAG (S) as size of constraint system S.
The DAG-representation of a term t has the similar structure as it was shown for con-
straint system apart from the second part of a tagging function: we need only root (f(v)) as
a node's tag. The size of this representation will be polynomially bounded by sizeDAG (t).
4.1 Satisﬁability of a general DY+ACI constraint systems is in NP
Lemma 16. Given a term t. Normalization can be done in polynomial time on sizeDAG (t).
Proof idea. The algorithm of normalization works bottom-up by ﬂattening nested ACI-sets,
sorting children of ACI-set nodes, removing duplicates and removing nodes without incoming
edges (except the root of t).
Proposition 11. The general constraint system within DY+ACI satisﬁability problem, that
Algorithm 3 solves, is in NP .
4Label 1 (resp.2) of an edge is represented by a left (resp. right) side of its source node
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Figure 4: DAG-representation of constraint system S
Proof. Algorithm 3 returns a proof for decision problem if it exists. We have to show, that
veriﬁcation of this proof takes a polynomial time with regard to initial problem size. As
the size, we will consider space needed to write down input's DAG-representation.
First, we will normalize Sσ. From Lemma 16 follows, that we can do it for the time Tpq ≤∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t} Ppq(sizeDAG (qσ)), where Ppq is some polynomial with non-negative co-
eﬃcients.
From the Proposition 12 we will know that check of derivability of a normalized ground
term g from set of normalized ground terms G takes a polynomial time depending on
sizeDAG (G ∪ {g}). I.e. there exists a polynomial Pg with non-negative coeﬃcients, such
that number of operations (execution time) to verify the derivability (g from G) will be
limited by Pg(sizeDAG (G ∪ {g})). Then the execution time for checking a set of ground
constraints {Gi B gi}i=1,...,n will be limited by
∑n
i=1 Pg(sizeDAG (Gi ∪ {gi})).
The algorithm gives a proof σ (a normalized substitution) such that ∀x ∈ dom (σ),
sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S).
To show that the algorithm is in NP we need to show, that execution time of check is
polynomial limited by measure of algorithm's input, i.e. there exists a polynomial P , such
that execution time does not exceed O(P (n× sizeDAG (S))) steps.
In our case, execution time T of a check will be T = Tpq + Tg, where Tg is a time
needed for checking ground derivability of Sσ: Tg ≤
∑n
i=1 Pg(sizeDAG (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq). As
Pg is a polynomial, let us say, of degree m
′ > 0, with non-negative coeﬃcients (as well
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as Ppq of degree m
′′ > 0), we can use the fact, that for any positive integers x1, . . . , xk,∑k
i=1 Pg(xi) ≤ Pg(
∑k
i=1 xi). Then we have Tg ≤ Pg(
∑n
i=1 sizeDAG (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq)) and by
Statement 16 of Lemma 3 we have Tg ≤ Pg(
∑n
i=1 sizeDAG ((Ei ∪ {ti})σ)); using the same
lemma, we have
Tg ≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
sizeDAG (Ei ∪ {ti}) + sizeDAG
(⋃
x
xσ
)))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
sizeDAG (Ei) + sizeDAG (ti) +
∑
x
sizeDAG (xσ)
))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(2 sizeDAG (S)) + n×
∑
x
(sizeDAG (xσ))
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× sizeDAG (S) + n×
∑
x
(2× sizeDAG (S))
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× sizeDAG (S) + 2× n× (sizeDAG (S))2
) ≤
≤ Pg
(
4× n× (sizeDAG (S))2
) ≤ Pg (4× (n× sizeDAG (S))2) =
= O
(
(n× sizeDAG (S))2m
′)
.
On the other hand,
Tpq ≤
∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
Ppq(sizeDAG (qσ)) ≤ Ppq
 ∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
sizeDAG (qσ)
 ≤
≤ Ppq
 ∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
(
sizeDAG (q) + sizeDAG
(⋃
x
xσ
)) ≤
≤ Ppq
n× (sizeDAG (S))2 + ∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
∑
x
sizeDAG (xσ)
 ≤
≤ Ppq
n× (sizeDAG (S))2 + 2× sizeDAG (S)× ∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
∑
x
1
 ≤
≤ Ppq
n× (sizeDAG (S))2 + 2× (sizeDAG (S))2 × ∑
EBt∈S
∑
q∈E∪{t}
1
 ≤
≤ Ppq
(
n× (sizeDAG (S))2 + 2× (sizeDAG (S))3 × n
)
≤
≤ Ppq
(
3× (n× sizeDAG (S))3
)
= O
(
(n× sizeDAG (S))3m
′′)
.
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Thus, T = O
(
(n× sizeDAG (S))3m
′′
+ (n× sizeDAG (S))2m
′)
that shows, that a test of
a proof returned by the algorithm takes polynomial time what gives us a class of complexity.
4.2 Ground derivability in DY+ACI is in P
Proposition 12. Algorithm 2 has a polynomial complexity on sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}).
Proof. We will give a very coarse estimate.
First remark, that in any step of algorithm, |S| and |D| don't exceed |QSub (E ∪ {t})|.
Building of sets QSub (E) ∪ QSub (t) takes linear time on sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}). Build-
ing S will take not more than O (|E| × |QSub (E) ∪QSub (t)|), that is, not more than
O
(
(sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))2
)
.
The main loop has at most |QSub (E ∪ {t})| − |E| steps. Searching for DY rule with
left-hand side in D and right-hand side in S is not greater that O(|S| × |D|2) and thus,
not greater that O((sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))3). The next if can be performed in O(|S| × |D| ×
(sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))) steps and the last if can be also done for cubic time. The check done
in return statement is linear. And ﬁnally, thanks to the Statement 15 of Lemma 3, we can
easily justify the claimed complexity.
5 Satisﬁability of general DY constraint system
The previous result on constraint solving for DY+ACI theory can be projected to the classi-
cal DY case. We cannot apply it directly, as in the resulting solution we will probably have
an ACI symbol. Thus, we need to prove the decidability of DY case. The scheme we follow
to solve a constraint system within DY deduction system is shown in Figure 5.
First, we can show that if a constraint system is satisﬁable within DY, then it is satisﬁable
within DY+ACI(Proposition 13).
Second, as we know, we can ﬁnd a solution of a given constraint system within DY+ACI.
Third, we will transform the solution obtained from previous step (which is in DY+ACI)
in such a way, that the resulting substitution will be a solution of initial constraint system
within DY(Theorem 2). The idea of satisfactory transformation δ is simple: we replace any
ACI list of terms with nested pairs: · ({t1, . . . , tn}) we replace with pair (t1,pair (..., tn)).
Note, that this transformation will have a linear complexity and the transformed solution
will have the DAG-size not more than twice bigger than initial. This gives us a class of
complexity, which is NP, for the problem of satisﬁability of general constraint system within
DY model.
RR n° 7276
42 Avanesov, Chevalier, Rusinowitch, Turuani
Figure 5: Proof Plan
Deﬁnition 5.1. We deﬁne a replacement δ (t) : Tg 7→ Tg in the following way:
δ (t) =

t, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
bin (δ (p) , δ (q)) , if t = bin (p, q) ,
priv (δ (p)) , if t = priv (p) ;
δ (t1) , if t = · (t1) ;
pair (δ (t1) , δ (· (t2, . . . , tm))) , if t = · (t1, . . . , tm) ,m > 1;
Deﬁnition 5.2. Given substitution σ. Then δ (σ) = {x→ δ (xσ)}x∈dom(σ). For T ⊆ Tg,
δ (T ) = {δ (t) : t ∈ T}.
Let us recall classical Dolev-Yao deduction system (DY) in Table 3.
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → enc (t1, t2) enc (t1, t2) , t2 → t1
t1, t2 → aenc (t1, t2) aenc (t1, t2) ,priv (t2)→ t1
t1, t2 → pair (t1, t2) pair (t1, t2)→ t1
t1,priv (t2)→ sig (t1,priv (t2)) pair (t1, t2)→ t2
Table 3: DY deduction system rules
Deﬁnition 5.3. A constraint system S standard, if ∀s ∈ Sub (S) root (s) 6= ·. The deﬁni-
tion is extended in natural way to terms, sets of terms and substitutions.
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We can redeﬁne the notion of derivation for Dolev-Yao deduction system in a natural
way, and denote it as DerDY .
Lemma 17. Any standard constraint system is normalized.
Lemma 18. Let t be a standard term, σ be a normalized substitution. Then tσ is normalized.
Proposition 13. If a standard constraint system S has a solution σ within DY deduction
system, then S has a solution within DY+ACI deduction system.
Proof. It is enough to consider the same solution σ in DY+ACI. As Sσ is normalized and as
DY+ACI includes all the rules from DY, it is easy to show using the same derivation that
proves σ to be a solution in DY, that σ stays a solution of S in DY+ACI.
The goal of the following reasoning is to show that we can build a solution of a constraint
system within DY from a solution of this constraint system within DY+ACI.
Lemma 19. For any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, if li are normalized for all i = 1, . . . , k
then δ (r) ∈ DerDY ({δ (l1) , . . . , δ (lk)}).
Proof. Let us consider all possible rules:
 t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q
As t1 and t2 are normalized, then ppair (t1, t2)q = pair (t1, t2). We can see, that
δ (pair (t1, t2)) = pair (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) ∈ DerDY ({δ (t1) , δ (t2)}).
 t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of previous one.
 t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of previous one.
 t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
As t1 and priv (t2) are normalized, then psig (t1,priv (t2))q = sig (t1,priv (t2)). We can
see, that δ (sig (t1,priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) , δ (priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) ,priv (δ (t2))) ∈
DerDY ({δ (t1) ,priv (δ (t2))}), but priv (δ (t2)) = δ (priv (t2)).
 t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
The fact, that elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ti) follows from ti = ptiq (for
all i) and Lemma 3.
We can (DY)-derive from {δ (ti)} any term in δ (elems (ti)), trivially, if ti 6= · (L) and
by applying rules pair (s1, s2)
DY−−→ s1 and pair (s1, s2) DY−−→ s2 otherwise (proof by
induction on size of ti).
One can observe, that δ (t) is a pairing (composition of pair (·, ·) operator with itself)
of δ (elems (t)) (by deﬁnition of δ (·) and normalization function). And then, as δ (t)
is limited in size, we can (DY)-derive δ (t) from δ (elems (t)) by iterative use of rule
s1, s2
DY−−→ pair (s1, s2), if needed.
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Thus, ﬁrst we can derive δ (elems (ti)) for all i, and then rebuild (derive with compo-
sition rules) δ (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q).
 enc (t1, t2) , pt2q→ pt1q.
As enc (t1, t2) is normalized, then t1 = pt1q and t2 = pt2q.
Thus, δ (t1) ∈ DerDY ({enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) , δ (t2)}) and this is what we need, because
δ (enc (t1, t2)) = enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)).
 pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Similar case.
 pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Similar case.
 aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. Similar case. Note, that δ (priv (t2)) = priv (δ (t2))
 · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq.
As we said above, δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))) ⊆ DerDY ({δ (· (t1, . . . , tm))}); and because
δ (elems (ti)) ⊆ δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))), we can (DY)-derive (by composition rules)
δ (ti) from δ (elems (ti)).
Proposition 14. Given a standard constraint system S and its normalized solution σ in
DY+ACI. Then, for any subterm of the system t ∈ Sub (S), we have δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
Proof. The proof is done by induction as in Proposition 5.
 Let sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then either t ∈ A or t ∈ X . Both are trivial cases.
 Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if sizeDAG (t) ≤ k, then δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
 Show, that for t such that sizeDAG (t) ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q) or t = priv (p) and
sizeDAG (p) ≤ k and sizeDAG (q) ≤ k, statement δ (tσ) = tδ (σ) is still true. We have:
 either t = bin (p, q). As δ (bin (p, q)σ) = δ (bin (pσ, qσ)) = bin (δ (pσ) , δ (qσ)) =
bin (pδ (σ) , qδ (σ)) = bin (p, q) δ (σ).
 or t = priv (p). In this case the proof can be done by analogy with previous one.
Remark: as S is standard, t 6= · (L).
Theorem 2. Given a standard constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n and its normalized
solution σ in DY+ACI. Then δ (σ) is a solution in DY of S.
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Proof. Let E B t be any element of S. As σ is a solution of S, then ptσq ∈ Der (pEσq). As
σ is normalized and S is standard, using Lemma 18 we have ptσq = tσ and pEσq = Eσ.
Then, tσ ∈ Der (Eσ). That means, there exists a DY+ACI derivation D = {A0, . . . , Ak}
such that A0 = Eσ and tσ ∈ Ak.
By Lemma 19 and Lemma 2 (which also works for DY case) we can easily prove that if
k > 0, δ (Aj) ⊆ DerDY (δ (Aj−1)) , j = 1, . . . , k. Note, that δ (A) is a set of standard terms
(and thus, normalized) for any set of terms A. Then, applying transitivity of DerDY (·)
(Lemma 1 for DY) k times, we have that δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)). In the case where k = 0,
the statement δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) is also true.
Using Proposition 14 we have that δ (A0) = δ (Eσ) = Eδ (σ), as E ⊆ QSub (S). The
same for t: δ (tσ) = tδ (σ), and as tσ ∈ Ak, we have tδ (σ) ∈ δ (Ak).
Thus, we have that tδ (σ) ∈ δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) = DerDY (Eδ (σ)), that means
δ (σ) DY-satisﬁes any constraint of S.
We present an example illustrating the theorem.
Example 8. Let us consider a standard constraint system similar to one in Example 5.
S =
{
enc (x, a) ,pair (c, a) B b
pair (x, c) B a
}
,
Using Algorithm 3, we can get a solution of S within DY+ACI, let's say, as in Example 6,
σ = {x 7→ · ({a, b, c})}.
Then, by applying transformation δ (·), we will get σ′ = δ (σ) = {x 7→ pair (a,pair (b, c))}.
We can see, that σ′ is also a solution of S within DY(as it was proven in Theorem 2).
Corollary 3 (of Theorem 2 and Proposition 13). A standard constraint system S is satis-
ﬁable within DY iﬀ it is satisﬁable within DY+ACI.
Corollary 4. Satisﬁability of constraint system within DY is in NP .
6 Conclusions
In this work we have presented a decision algorithm for solving Dolev Yao general constraints
as well as ones extended with an ACI symbol, which can be used to represent sets of terms.
The complexity of the algorithm was proved to be in NP .
We have given also three applications of the presented result: protocol insecurity with
non-communicating intruders, protocol synthesis and discovering XML-based attacks.
Further work is aimed to extend the results to other deduction systems and equality
theories.
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APPENDIX
A General constraints for subterm theories
Let us call a subterm deduction system a set of rules of two forms:
 composition rules: for all public functional symbols f , x1, . . . , xk → f(x1, . . . , xk)
 decomposition rules t1, . . . , tm → s, where s is a subterm of ti for some i.
We show that the satisﬁability of constraint system within subterm deduction system is
undecidable in general. More precisely:
Instance: a subterm deduction system D, a constraint system C.
Question: is C satisﬁable ?
To show this, we reduce the halting problem of a Deterministic Turing Machine (TM) M
that works on a single tape. We consider the tape alphabet Γ = {0, 1, [}, and [ is the blank
symbol. The states of the TM M are in a ﬁnite set Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. W.l.o.g. we can
assume that q1 (resp. qn) is the unique initial (resp. accepting) state.
In order to represent Turing machine conﬁguration as terms we shall introduce a set of
variables X and an alphabet F
F := {0, 1, [,⊥} ∪Q,
where F \ {⊥} are public functional symbols.
The TM conﬁguration with tape ⊥ abcde ⊥, (where ⊥ is an endmarker), with symbol d
under the head, and state q will be represented by the following term of q(c(b(a(⊥), d(e(⊥), x)
where x ∈ X and a, b, c, d, e ∈ {0, 1, [}.
The composition rules we consider for the TM are u → f(u) for each f ∈ {0, 1, [} and
u, v, w → q(u, v, w) for each q ∈ Q. For each TM transition of M we will introduce some de-
composition deduction rule that can be applied on a term representation q(u, v, q′(u′, v′, x′))
iﬀ the transition can be applied to a conﬁguration represented by q(u, v,_) and generate
a conﬁguration represented by q′(u′, v′,_). For each TM instruction of type: In state q
reading a go to state q′ and write b, we deﬁne the following rule for a, b ∈ {0, 1, [}:
q(u, a(v), q′(u, b(v), x))→ q′(u, b(v), x)
For each instruction of type: In state q reading a go to state q′ and move right, we
deﬁne the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} :
q(u, a(v), q′(a(u), v, x))→ q′(a(u), v, x)
A rule is for extending the tape on the right when needed:
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q(u,⊥, q′([(u),⊥, x))→ q′([(u),⊥, x)
For each instruction of type: In state q reading a go to state q′ and move left, we deﬁne
the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} :
q(a(u), v, q′(u, a(v), x))→ q′(u, a(v), x)
A rule is for extending the tape on the left when needed:
q(⊥, a(v), q′(⊥, [(a(v)), x))→ q′(⊥, [(a(v)), x)
The resulting deduction system DM is obviously a subterm deduction system.
Let us consider a constraint S to be solved modulo DM :
q1(⊥,⊥, x)B qn(y, z, w)
This constraint is satisﬁable iﬀ there is a sequence of transitions ofM from a conﬁguration
with initial state q1 and empty tape to a conﬁguration with an accepting state. Hence the
constraint solving problem is undecidable.
Let us recall the deﬁnition of some properties of constraint systems. These two properties
are natural for modeling standard security protocols:
variable origination: ∀i, ∀x ∈ Vars (Ei) ∃j < i x ∈ Vars (tj),
monotonicity: j < i =⇒ Ej ⊆ Ei.
Note that {q1(⊥,⊥, x)B qn(y, z, w)} is obviously monotonic.
As a consequence, satisﬁability of monotonic constraint systems (but without variable
origination) is undecidable. Here is another constraint system, where variable origination
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is satisﬁed, but monotony is not. It can be used for reducing the halting problem again:
{⊥B x, q1(⊥,⊥, x)B qn(y, z, w)}
As a consequence, satisﬁability of constraint systems with variable origination (but with-
out monotonicity) is undecidable.
We should note by contrast (see [3]), that constraint solving in subterm convergent
theories is decidable if the constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n satisﬁes both variable
origination and monotonicity.
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